BSP Annual Conference 2016

The Future of Phenomenology

Keynote Abstracts

Havi Carel

Havi Carel grew up in Tel Aviv, where she completed a BA in Philosophy Single Honours (1994) and an MA in History and Philosophy of Science (1998). She came to the UK in 1998 to study for her PhD, on the concept of death, which she completed in 2002, at the University of Essex, under the supervision of Simon Critchley.

Upon graduation she took up a lectureship at the University of York, and then spent two years in Australia, working at the Australian National University in Canberra. She returned to the UK in 2006, and worked at UWE, Bristol until coming to Bristol in 2013.

Havi was made Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol in 2014. Her research examines the experience of illness and of receiving healthcare. In 2014 she was awarded a Senior Investigator Award by the Wellcome Trust, for a five year project entitled 'Life of Breath' (with Prof Jane Macnaughton, Durham University).

She recently completed a monograph for Oxford University Press, entitled *Phenomenology of Illness* (out in September 2016) and she previously published on the embodied experience of illness, epistemic injustice, wellbeing within illness and on the experience of respiratory illness in the *Lancet*, *BMJ*, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*, *Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy*, and in edited collections.

Havi is the author of *Illness* (2008, 2013), shortlisted for the Wellcome Trust Book Prize, and of *Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger* (2006). She is the co-editor of *Health, Illness and Disease* (2012) and of *What Philosophy Is* (2004). She uses film in teaching and has co-edited a volume entitled *New Takes in Film-Philosophy* (2010). She also co-edited a special issue of *Philosophy* on 'Human Experience and Nature' (2013).

In 2009-11 Havi led an AHRC-funded project on the concepts of health, illness and disease. In 2011-12 she was awarded a Leverhulme Fellowship for a project entitled 'The Lived Experience of Illness'. In 2012-13 she held a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship.

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Invisible Suffering: A Phenomenology of Breathlessness

In this talk I present a phenomenological framework for the understanding of the experience of breathlessness. I suggest that the experience of breathlessness is total and overwhelming to the sufferer, but also largely invisible to the outsider. How does this tension affect respiratory medicine and clinical work? How could the first person experience of breathlessness be harnessed in the clinic? And what can phenomenology offer this process? The talk will also discuss the Wellcome Trust-funded *Life of Breath* project that engages philosophy and other humanities disciplines to explore these questions.

Felix Ó Murchadha

Felix Ó Murchadha is a Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Ireland, Galway (Ireland). A former Fulbright Scholar he has published articles, papers, books and book chapters on Phenomenology, in particular, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of violence. He has recently published two monographs *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger* London: Bloomsbury, 2013) and *A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). He is presently working on a book provisionally entitled "The Fidelity of Reason and the Rationality of Faith: A Phenomenology of the Self".

Speaking after the Phenomenon: Faith and the Passion of Being

Phenomenology speaks not directly of phenomena but rather of the appearing of phenomena. In so speaking we move from the level of things with generic or proper names, the level of things which are present or potentially so, to the level of universal terms and that which cannot be present, that past which was never present and that future which will never be fulfilled. This situation which grounds phenomenology can be expressed in the preposition 'after' understood in its twofold meaning: coming later and going in pursuit. In speaking of the appearing of what appears we are speaking after the phenomenon, in particular after the 'promise' which every phenomenon holds. Speaking after is a desiring, which needs to be heard in a twofold manner: To desire something is to lack it, but also to have it in its excess, as that which exceeds what is present. We have then a constellation of three spheres: time (the temporality of 'after'), desire (the dynamics of lack and excess) and language (the expression of what is in speech). This paper will discuss the relation of these three spheres to one another with respect to the mode of being of the speaking and thinking self towards things. In doing so it will make a case for understanding Phenomenology as a form of First Philosophy or Metaphysics situated between faith and reason.

Darian Meacham

Darian Meacham is a lecturer in philosophy at UWE, Bristol and from October 2016 will join the philosophy department at Maastricht University, Netherlands. He also works with BrisSynBio, a Synthetic Biology Research Centre based at University of Bristol, as the researcher in ethics of technology and 'responsible innovation'. Some recent projects include _Maine de Biran, The Relationship Between the Physical and the Moral in Man_ (Bloomsbury 2016) and _Thinking After Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics_ (Rowman and Littlefield 2016), with Francesco Tava. He is currently also working on a project concerning automation, basic income and work, and has recently written for openDemocracy.net on the topic.

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Phenomenology of Technology: How Low Can You Go? BioEnactivism, Phenomenology and Cognitive Biology

The branch of enactive philosophy known as bio-enactivism seek to extend enactivist analyses of embodied cognition to the field of the living per se, such that enactive sense-making becomes not only the fundamental characteristic of mind, but also of life (Thompson 2007, 2011; Di Paolo 2009; De Jesus 2015, 2016). These philosophers insist upon a 'strong mind life continuity thesis.' In short, mind is a continuation or development of activity – an inflationary notion of cognizing – that is found in all life. There remains in this work a strong emphasis on subjectivity and a 'whole organism approach.' By looking at recent research in cognitive biology and protocell construction, I pose the question of how far down embodied cognition really goes? Can we talk about embodied cognition at the level of individual proteins? And if so, are we still talking about the same thing as enactivists do when they talk about human cognition. I argue that in order to make a substantial argument about the relation between life and mind, enactivism needs to be supported by an ontology similar to what we find in instances of a-subjective phenomenology and French biophilosophy.

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Paper Abstracts

Panel A: Developing Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

Elisa Magri: *Is Phenomenology a Form of Empathy?*

In this paper, I shall interrogate whether and how a phenomenological approach to pathologies of self-awareness enables us not only to describe the nature of those states, but also to empathically grasp them. Following Ratcliffe (2012), I shall argue that phenomenology, as a method, facilitates a distinct type of empathy (radical empathy), one that expands the range of intelligible experiences. However, I shall consider whether and how the phenomenological method allows different ways to reduce and analyse the same phenomenon. With regard to this issue, I shall propose a distinct case study, i.e. obsessions and the experience of lived space by looking at Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's different methods. I will show that, while Sartre and Merleau-Ponty anticipate an empathic understanding of obsessive states, they offer two different interpretative models for their investigation. With regard to this issue, I shall reconsider the phenomenological reduction and its relation to pathologies of self-awareness in light of the possibilities of radical empathy.

Robert Booth: *Merleau-Ponty, Correlationism, and Alterity*

The very possibility of a suitably environmentally-focused (eco)phenomenology has been challenged through the recent upsurge of speculative realist metaphysics. A common speculative realist commitment holds that phenomenologists cannot adequately address more-than-human entities on their own terms because phenomenology is paradigmatically correlationist. The standard charge of correlationism holds that because the phenomenological subject actively structures all of its experience, phenomenology can only ever make sense of the world as correlate for the (human) subject, rather than the world as it is in-itself beyond or before the subject. Correlationism purportedly leads to unpalatable conclusions (e.g. technoscientific instrumentalism, large-scale environmental degradation caused by rampant consumerism, exclusionary anthropocentric politics) for the more-than-human world thereby reduced. In this paper I address the correlationist charge against Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in two ways. Firstly, I intend to show that if Merleau-Ponty does advance a correlationist phenomenology, this is because of a well-justified desire to retain the genuine alterity of other parties revealed in experience, serious engagement with which is paradoxically better attuned to something like correlationist philosophy. Secondly, I intend to explore the carnality of the body-subject to problematize the claim that Merleau-Ponty advances a correlationist philosophy, at least in any seriously detrimental sense. Ultimately, I hope to show that, partly by reinstating the centrality of the body to (radically-reflective) phenomenological investigation, Merleau-Ponty can nullify the problems supposedly introduced by correlationism even if the charge is true.

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Panel B: History and Time

Tony O'Connor: *Making Phenomenology Effective*

I address Dan Zahavi's critique of Jean-Luc Marion on the possibility of unifying competing practices and goals of phenomenology as found in the alternative approaches of Husserl and Heidegger.

Marion favours Heideggerian fundamental ontology over Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. He thinks that Husserl fails to address Heidegger's question of what unites and makes possible our varied senses of what it is to be, because Husserl never understood Heidegger's concern with ontological difference, or a difference in Being.

Zahavi thinks that Marion's criticism is invalid because Husserl has investigated phenomenality, or the nature of phenomena. Further, Husserl analysed the non-objectifying mode of Being of consciousness, and discussed the interplay between presence and absence. This shows the limitations of Marion's view of Husserl.

I shall argue that both Zahavi's and Marion's positions are flawed because they do not give adequate weight to the hermeneutical claim that humans are always involved interpretively in contingent pre-shaping traditions and cultural contexts. I shall support this with the views of Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty and Foucault.

Gadamer's notions of effective historical consciousness and the fusion of horizons are valuable. They show how humans are inseparably embodied behaviourally and linguistically in the world and its cultural traditions. Historically-effected consciousness shows that our involvement in the world involves our pre-formation by contextual interpretational backgrounds, which we, in turn, shape and reshape. Contextual understanding and interpretation operate within and across horizons and history, the understanding and interpretation of which is never finished.

This gives weight to Merleau-Ponty's account of the task of effective phenomenology, namely, to recover a historicized phenomenology that revises the usual essentialist notions of necessity and contingency. It involves an anticipation of Foucault's archaeological finding regarding the 'historical apriori', which allows the reinterpretation of Husserl's and Heidegger's themes in historicist terms.

Andrea Rehberg: *Zur Zukunft der Zukünftigen / Towards the Future of the Ones to Come*

Recent years have seen a number of works on time, specifically futurity, as a central issue in phenomenology (e.g., Reynolds, Lawlor, Hoy, and DeRoo). Without going into any detailed discussion of this literature, some points made in it will form the backdrop to this paper. Specifically, charting the path that leads from, on the one hand, the understanding of the issue of futurity in phenomenology to, on the other hand, the futural possibilities of phenomenology as a discipline, will be the chief concern of this presentation. But since these are far-reaching and complex matters, and since a broad overview of them is neither possible nor desirable in the time available, in the main part of the paper I will mobilise some of Heidegger's thoughts, both early and late, on the matter to help us chart the above-mentioned path.

Departing from Heidegger's beyng-historical (*seynsgeschichtliche*) investigations, above all in the *Beiträge*, in *Die Geschichte des Seyns*, and the lectures "Identity and Difference" and "Time and Being", I will first set out the connections between *Er-eignis/Ent-eignis*, *Dasein*'s dispositions of presentiment (*Ahnung*) and restraint (*Verhaltenheit*) as appropriate to this reciprocal event, and Heidegger's projection of the futural ones or the ones to come (*die Zukünftigen*). From out of this nexus a notion of futurity emerges that is simultaneously to be understood in terms of anticipatory resoluteness as the condition of possibility of all presencing (familiar from Being and Time), and as a structural element in the moment, glance or blink of

the eye (*Augenblick*) itself. Taken in both of these senses, what the notion of futurity thereby loses is any reference to a merely ontically conceived future. This in turn helps us to grasp more clearly the two senses of the 'future' of phenomenology, set out above.

Panel C: Ethics, Politics, and Violence

Ashika L. Singh: *Dwelling, Building and Homelessness*

The 'home' is at the heart of discourse surrounding Heidegger's being-in-the-world *qua* dwelling. While this starting-point is novel, it is problematically contrasted with homelessness, even by the most politically liberal of phenomenologists (such as, Edward Casey). Although efforts have been made to problematize and politicise the home (particularly by feminist thinkers), little focus is placed on its devalued counterpart. In this paper, I argue that we continue to privilege the home and so ignore the consequences both conceptual and material of this dichotomisation. This is ultimately shortsighted, philosophically and socio-politically. I criticise the existential circumspection of homelessness found in Heideggarian anti-modernism and place this circumspection back into its concrete origins. This criticism therefore attacks Heidegger's (and Casey's) implicit reification of the home as the patriarchal household (*oikos*) and the equation of modern *Unheimlichkeit* with the city and homelessness found within. The problem hereby addressed in this paper is the devaluation of homelessness to a *lack* of a home. To reveal why this devaluation occurs, I will sketch out a deconstruction of the binary. In doing this, I will show that the home-homelessness distinction is accounted for in the distinction between house and urban space and ultimately in the distinction between private and public spheres. It is my contention that it is not so much 'modernity' that incurs a persistent state of homelessness, but the exclusionary and oppressive nature of the demarcation of place *via* capital. In turn, I claim that Heideggarian dwelling sustains the perception of homelessness that informs aggressive anti-homeless public policy. While there is undeniable merit in phenomenological conceptions of dwelling, I insist that the Heideggarian dweller neglects the liberating potential of cities and the radical significance of homelessness.

Petr Kouba: *Phenomenology of Sacrifice*

The phenomenon of sacrifice has been analyzed by Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bataille, and many other philosophers. In my paper I intend to examine the phenomenon of sacrifice from the phenomenological point of view as outlined by Jan Patočka, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion. With their help I would like to differentiate several kinds of sacrifice (strategic, moral, political, and religious), but above all I am interested in the limits of sacrifice. Provided that the fields of morality, politics and religion are opened by sacrifice, is there any morality, politics and religion without one? And if so, what is the meaning of morality, politics and religion that are not based on some kind of sacrifice? These questions seem essential in our time, when the meaning of sacrifice is compromised by acts of terrorism. It is relatively easy to denounce terrorism and its propaganda, which uses the concept of martyrdom, as an inauthentic approach to the experience of sacrifice (Marion). But how could we break its spell if we believe that sacrifice brings our existence to completeness (Patočka)? How can we avoid the inauthentic forms of sacrifice, if we believe that without sacrifice we must fall into nihilism and indifference?

Verity James-Sinetos: *Phenomenology and Sexual Trauma*

This paper examines the phenomena of sexual trauma and its' manifestations and effects from a phenomenological perspective. It extracts Merleau-Ponty's theories expressed in *Phenomenology of Perception* and applies them to the phenomena of sexual trauma with a particular focus on embodiment, perception and his conception of the 'schizophrenic' subject.

This paper is of a thematic nature, and looks in turn at the individual who has experienced sexual trauma and their phenomenological relationship with the body, time, memory and perception. This phenomenological analysis offers an alternative perspective to sexual trauma that breaks from the traditional psychoanalytic or psychiatric trajectory.

My point of departure begins with the initial act of sexual trauma and how it is perceived by the human body as a perceptual apparatus. I will then explore the nature of the 'disembodying' act of sexual trauma and how this may manifest itself in specific bodily phenomena. Finally, I will posit the sexually traumatised individual in parallel to Merleau-Ponty's 'schizophrenic' subject. I draw on R.D. Laing's insights on schizophrenia to complement this juxtaposition.

I intend to create a new lens through which we can analyse sexual trauma as a perceptual phenomenon, within which the body as perceptual apparatus is fundamentally altered, consequently modifying the individual's perception of the world and their place in it.

This paper provides a view of sexual trauma from a human, embodied, and lived-experienced perspective. It promises nor offers substantial or tangible answers or solutions to the problematic of sexual trauma, but instead provides a point of departure that aims to apprehend the experience of sexual trauma phenomenologically, through spatial and temporal themes.

Panel D: Phenomenology and Science

Bence Marosan: *Phenomenological biology: A proposal for future phenomenology*

Perhaps the most important question of phenomenology concerns the nature and origin of consciousness. The core of my paper is the thought that one cannot answer this question without the intensive research of lower levels of biological nature (first of all: the biology of lower level animals [invertebrata] and of microbes) and phenomenological reflections on these researches. That is to say: in my opinion the key to the progress of future phenomenology is a highly elaborated phenomenological biology. The intimate connection between phenomenology and biology has a long history and a widespread, rich context. We can find it in Husserl, who said that biology has "a special proximity to the sources evidence", and "that its access to transcendental philosophy should be the easiest" (Husserliana 6: 483), we can find it in Merleau-Ponty, and in the classical and contemporary authors of phenomenological anthropology, today – amongst others – in Eco-phenomenology and Neuro-phenomenology. So we can ask with a good reason: what would be the novelty of this present project in comparison with the already existing, biologically oriented phenomenological philosophies? I propose two, strongly related central topics for a future phenomenologically interpreted biology: the problem of demarcation of conscious and non-conscious living beings and the problem of information. My idea is that we can separate conscious and non-conscious beings from each other, and also unfold the very nature of consciousness, by a closer analysis of how organisms handle and process information. That is to say: in my opinion a phenomenology of information could help us to penetrate the shell of objectivity toward subjective immanence. There have been interesting attempts in this field in the last decades (e.g. Introna-Whittaker, 2003), but the most interesting, most exciting discoveries are still waiting to be achieved.

Emiliano Trizio: *Science, metaphysics and the crisis of rationality*

In this paper I criticize some of the current interpretations of Husserl's notion of a crisis of Western sciences and provide an alternative reading that fits into Husserl's overall theory of science. First, I highlight Husserl's two preliminary constraints on the notion of crisis: 1) a science can be said to be in a crisis, only if its scientificity has become questionable; and, 2) the *prima facie* scientificity of (most of) our sciences is not questionable. This implies that what Husserl is looking for is a deeper sense of scientificity that, instead, has become questionable. This allows criticizing the common account of the crisis of sciences as "the loss of their meaning for life", for the latter notion, while referring to a real and crucial phenomenon cannot be equated with a crisis of scientificity. It will appear that this perceived loss, which Husserl is far from denying, is used by Husserl as a starting point for a historical illustration of the fact that our sciences are just a residue of the idea of a universal philosophy culminating in a metaphysics that did bestow upon them significance for life. This will make possible to answer the crucial question underlying Husserl's text: "how did the demise of the idea of universal philosophy impact the *scientificity* of the sciences?" The answer is worked out through a survey of part II of the *Krisis*, which highlights that what has become *enigmatic* is precisely the domain of being that they take as object. This fact constitutes the questionability of their deeper or authentic scientificity, and, thus, their real crisis. I conclude briefly outlining the relations between the crisis of metaphysics, the crisis of the sciences, and the general crisis of Western rationality.

Panel E: Perception, Experience, and Intentionality

Māra Grīnfelde: *Is Unconditional Givenness Possible? Jean-Luc Marion's Idea of the Saturated Phenomenon Reconsidered*

French thinker Jean-Luc Marion is probably best known for his hypothesis of the `saturated phenomenon' (*phénomène saturé*), namely, a hypothesis of a phenomenon that is characterized through the excess of intuition over intention. Even though during the last two decades this hypothesis has been criticized from different perspectives, the common theme has been the criticism of the unconditional self-givenness (*donation de soi*) of the saturated phenomenon. Although Marion has replied to some of the criticism, critics have remained unsatisfied. I want to argue that Marion is unable to convince some of his critics, because even though he uses one term (the saturated phenomenon), he actually refers to three different types of phenomena.

The aim of this paper is to show that there are three types of the saturated phenomenon in Marion's phenomenology, based on the role and character of intuition within them, and to argue that criticism against the saturated phenomenon should be reassessed based on this differentiation. The paper shows that based on Marion's examples and descriptions of the saturated phenomenon, one should distinguish between internally differentiated intuitive givenness (idol, icon, flesh, the taste of wine, etc.), internally undifferentiated intuitive givenness (intuitive bedazzlement) and non-intuitive givenness (death, birth, time). It is argued that both in the first and third cases the saturated phenomenon loses its unconditional self-givenness. In the first case intuitive givenness remains inscribed in the horizon of nonconceptual meaning, thus losing its unconditional character; in the third case, non-intuitive givenness remains inscribed in the horizon of conceptual meaning, thus also losing its unconditional character. It is concluded that only the second type of the saturated phenomenon can retain its unconditional self-givenness and withstand the existing criticism directed against it.

Bernardo Ainbinder: *Heidegger on colour-perception. A case for conceptualism in phenomenology*

In this paper, I will tackle a question that has been absent in the literature, namely, what is Heidegger's conception of colour-perception. Heidegger himself, unlike many phenomenologists, including Husserl, is silent about the topic. There may a be a good reason for that: since he insists on the primacy of meaningful holistic coping with the world, considering colours as an isolated topic may well be the result of adopting a theoretical privative point of view on experience that Heidegger rejects. I think this approach to the problem is wrongheaded. Heidegger's description of experience does not privilege some phenomena (say tools or meanings) vis-a-vis others (things, colours and the like) but a way of understanding experience in general (as organized in terms of a whole of meaningful relations where each single thing is defined by its normative import for the whole) vis-a-vis a a way of understanding it in terms of atomic items and stratified properties. I will call Heidegger's conception of experience a normative conceptual one (see Golob 2014).

Against this background, in this paper I will explore what Heidegger has to say about colours. In particular, I will claim:

1. that Heidegger's description of Umsicht, i.e. the way of coping with the world as a meaningful whole, is not limited to the typical forms of practical coping he explicitly mentions but can be extended to the analysis of basic cases such as colour-perception.

2. that such analyses provides some new and interesting insights into what perceiving colours means (some surprising points of contact with Sellars' analysis in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind may be drawn here).

3. that colours provide a prime example of Heidegger's normative conceptual conception of experience.

4. that some Heidegger-inspired approaches to the topic such as Kelly's are misguided. Kelly (2001) claimed that colour perception is a very good candidate to deny conceptualism, i.e. the thesis that contents of experience involve a form of articulation that is at least similar to the one expressed in judgment. I will claim, on the contrary, that colour perception is an excellent candidate to show in which sense conceptualism is true, precisely by analysing Kelly's examples of colour sorting.

Eric Chelstrom: *Seriality and We-Intentions: A Sartrean Contribution to Collective Intentionality*

The collective intentionality literature focuses on we-intentions. Group actions and institutional practices are seen as being founded on we-intentions. That literature assumes of groups that they are intentional formations in which the participants are willfully participating. By contrast, groupings like gender, race, and class are better understood as on the model of seriality, as argued by Iris Marion Young. Young adopts the concept of seriality from Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre's notion of seriality is useful in understanding other block identity markers whose constituent members have not self-asserted their grouping. Sartre further had some influence on the development of the idea of false consciousness, developed in more detail by Simone de Beauvoir in relation to sexual identity and Frantz Fanon in relation to racial identity. While serial grouping and false consciousness may at first blush seem unconnected, both develop within Sartre's thinking about how being-for-others affects one's experience of the world.

In this paper, I develop the Sartrean distinction of kinds of groups, voluntary and serial, and attempt to model the kinds of intentionality associated therewith in relation to the mode of intentionality of being-for-others. In contrast to mainstream collective intentionality theory, it is argued that the two distinctive kinds of 'we' and their distinctive forms of we-intention need to be treated distinctly. Voluntaristic we-

intentions are predicated from "within," where the agents in question form their own plans and actions together. Serial we-intentions are formed from "without," they are imposed on individuals by others. What's more serial we-intentions inform voluntaristic we-intentions insofar as one's self-understanding of one's identity – in which serial categories are often principal – establishes horizons of possibility associated with how one understands one's projects vis-à-vis voluntary actions. If accurate, that represents a serious problem for mainstream (non-phenomenologically informed) approaches to collective intentionality.

Panel F: Edmund Husserl and his Legacy

Uldis Vēgners: *Husserl's Time-Consciousness Reconsidered: A Case for a Changing Consciousness of Change*

The question about the possibility of time-consciousness is among the most important ones in Husserl's phenomenology. Underneath his life-long attempts to come to a satisfactory solution lies a basic assumption that succession of consciousness by itself is not sufficient for consciousness of succession. However, the assumption itself is based upon a premise according to which each moment of succession excludes all the other moments of it. If it is true that one moment of a succession excludes all others then it is easy to see that succession of consciousness is not yet a consciousness of succession, because all this succession gives is an actual moment and not all the moments together. Thus the greatest difficulty for Husserl is to show how the moments that constitute succession are united or brought together so, as to give consciousness of succession.

However, Husserl's adherence to the aforementioned premise has undermined his attempts to come to a satisfactory conception of time-consciousness. Either he has to accept a momentary nature of time-consciousness, which does not present a change but only that something has changed and/or will change, or face other serious problems. In order to escape from the problems Husserl's conceptions of time-consciousness face and to do justice to our changing consciousness of change, an alternative conception is proposed, one that is not based on the premise of mutual exclusion of successive moments. As it will be argued the premise not only leads to grave problems, it is also phenomenologically unwarranted. According to the proposed alternative conception moments of succession are not mutually exclusive, meaning that one moment can overlap with other moments. As it will be argued time-consciousness is constituted by a partial overlap of moments.

Francesco Tava: *History and Praxis: On the Milanese School of Phenomenology*

The aim of this paper is shedding light on the reception of Husserl's, as well as post-Husserlian phenomenology, in Italy, with special emphasis on the role that Antonio Banfi and Enzo Paci played in this peculiar philosophical context. Banfi and Paci are widely considered the most prominent representatives of the so-called "school of Milan", which originated in the aftermath of the Second World War, and later developed especially during the 1960s and 70s, giving rise to a lively debate which encompassed phenomenology, existential philosophy, and Marxist theory. Particularly, the reception of phenomenology allowed these thinkers to draw a theoretical path which radically diverged from neo-idealism, Christian thought, and historicism, the main philosophical trends in pre-war Italy. In this sense, Banfi's contribution in spreading the early works of Husserl in the Italian philosophical context, as well as Paci's reception of Husserl's Crisis, also through the mediation of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, constituted a chapter in the history of phenomenology which has been often neglected. In order to bridge this gap, I will particularly focus on some topics which Paci introduced in The Function of Sciences and the Meaning

of Man (1963; English translation, 1972). In this work, Paci engaged a critical analysis of contemporary history, and of those ideologies, like capitalism and dogmatic Marxism, which attempted to interpret the historical process as something merely positive and constructive, overlooking the fundamental role that free and creative human praxis played within it. So doing, Paci fostered a theoretical encounter between phenomenological analysis and some of the most remarkable cultural trends which were spreading in Western and Eastern Europe at that time: critical Marxism, political dissidence, and counterculture. In this paper, I will try to show both the merits and the limits of this rather neglected page of phenomenology's history, also in light of the most recent development of this discipline.

Panel G: Phenomenology in Practice

Philip Tovey: *A Remote Outpost Under Siege: A phenomenological understanding of officers and staff operating under a new core operating model.*

Much is written about the increasing tightening and stifling effects of the current austerity measures UK Police Forces are contending with and a new, leaner, more efficient organisational structure is often the selected adapted action that ensures the organisations economic survival. This driver predisposes a quantitative approach to understanding the affects of change, fearing the intangible for is subjective complexity, its difficulty in translating into monetary measures and determinate outcomes; and, as this paper will argue, is encapsulated in existential uncertainty. The largest Policing assets base is in its human, and subsequently social capital; domains best suited to a qualitative understanding, therefore, this embedded study conducted phenomenological inquiry into the phenomena of policing in a new operating model as part of an organisational reshaping. Findings suggest an experiential essence of isolation and remoteness, a knowledge 'updraft', hollow promises and a classical moralistic composition of 'good vs bad' in the subjects policing raison d'etre; all of which contrasts sharply with an evolving operational reality. Phenomenology as a methodological approach to influencing organisational change is discussed before the constituent themes are explored through an existential phenomenological framework, highlighting potential implications for policing human resource management and development.

Valeria Bizzari: *Phenomenology and its usefulness in psychopathology: an "embodied" proposal*

In the last few years, the phenomenological method and several notions such as *Leib*, natural attitude, corporeal schema and so on, have started to be addressed to the explanation of psychiatric diseases like schizophrenia and depression. In fact, adopting a phenomenological approach to the study of illness seems to allow a fully understanding of the complexity of the human being and an improving of the therapeutical phase too, taking into account the subjectivity of the patient, the person behind the symptoms and the disruptions of the structures of consciousness.

The aim of this paper is to describe how this could happen and to support the liceity of the usage of phenomenological tools in psychopathology, with a special attention to the issue of intersubjectivity. For this reason, after briefly comparing *Simulation Theories* and *Theory Theories*, I will support a phenomenological interpretation of the intersubjective experience and I will focus on those pathologies which seem to involve a disruption of the "Social Self", such as schizophrenia and autism, and I will suggest that they are essentially *intersubjective diseases* caused by a weakness of the pre-reflective and corporeal self-awareness.

I will support my thesis with a "phenomenological test" that I have developed and applied on an Asperger subject: a semi-structured interview that, taking into account the phenomenological method and its principles, as well as stimulating the subject through images and questions about emotions and beliefs, has allowed an exploration of his (inter)subjective structures.

In the last part of my talk, I will suggest a therapy focused on the fortification of intercorporeality and of bodily awareness: my conclusion will be that phenomenology could improve psychopathology not just methodologically but also in the treatment of the patients.

Ingrid Wilkinson: *Post-stroke changes in the embodied experience of walking – moving beyond body structures, activity and participation*

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The gait rehabilitation research tends to investigate body structures, activity and participation in line with World Health Organisation definitions and rarely focuses on individual's lived experience. This study appears to be the first to systematically explore walking from the perspective of individuals who have had a stroke.

This study aimed to highlight valued aspects of walking to inform outcome measurement and future clinical trials. Four interviews were undertaken using an interpretative phenomenological approach with people who were approximately three years post-stroke. The participants spoke about walking within the context of activities that they identified as personally important. They valued being able to walk distances at a reasonable speed, being independent, safe and confident. They missed their pre-stroke spontaneity, freedom, agility and their lost automatic body movement. The participants gave examples of post-stroke walking related changes in their self-perception, roles and embodied experience of walking that are rarely mentioned in the rehabilitation literature, apart from in personal accounts written by people living with chronic illness. They described their new unreliable post-stroke body that caused them to feel vulnerable.

Use of interpretive phenomenological analysis allowed an in depth exploration of walking and unanticipated themes emerged. Participants spoke about their previously 'taken for granted' body that they thematised post-stroke. This echoes Drew Leder's description of a body that recedes from our thoughts in health and advances to the foreground of our awareness in illness. These participants also spoke about changes in their personal freedom and autonomy resulting from post-stroke walking difficulties. Such ideas are found in philosophical publications but are rarely discussed in clinical rehabilitation journals. The study reported here has explored the embodied experience of walking and dissemination could begin a debate that may improve care and outcome measurement and lead to a greater understanding of walking as a phenomenon.

Panel H: Phenomenology of Education

Emma Williams: *The Ways We Think: Epistemology, Phenomenology and Education*

The significance of phenomenology for the field of education has been demonstrated in a number of ways (e.g. Shaun Gallaghar, 2016; Michael Peters, 2009; Paul Standish, 2002). My paper, which forms part

of a wider research project (Williams, 2016), aims to apply a phenomenological perspective to the educational question of critical thinking.

Affirmed as an indispensable feature of Western education (c.f. Martha Nussbaum, 2010), the development of critical thinking today forms an essential part of the learning objectives of many courses and qualifications across school and higher education. Yet educational theorizations of critical thinking – the question of what it is, or should, amount to – remain contentious. My paper aims to show how a *phenomenology of thinking* opens up a richer and more robust conception of critical thinking that than which currently dominates educational discussion.

My paper will take, as its point of departure, the influential, 'epistemological conception' of critical thinking developed by Harvey Siegel. Siegel (1998) has claimed, in response to Charles Taylor, that phenomenology leaves his account of critical thinking 'pretty much as it is'; yet my paper will argue that Siegel's dismissal of phenomenology is too hasty. By extending Taylor's discussion, and in particular his appeal to the Heideggerian tropes of the 'background' and the *Lichtung,* I will argue that phenomenology affords a conception of the ways we think – and the human being *who* thinks – which radically exceed the epistemological. Key to this will be the claim that Heidegger's philosophy moves us beyond a representational model of thinking and towards a new view of thought as receptivity and responsiveness. My paper will end by examining the educational implications of this phenomenologically inspired conception – both in terms of *what is called*, and *what calls for*, thinking in education today.

Miles Kennedy: *Where learning takes place: A phenomenological description of Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development*

Anyone studying teaching practice and pedagogy in recent years will have heard of Lev Semenovich Vygotsky's theory of social constructivism and his trademark idea, the "Zone of Proximal Development" or ZPD. Vygotsky described this Zone as "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p86). The Zone of Proximal Development, then, is more often than not described primarily in terms of "cognitive constructivism" thus remaining in territory similar to that mapped out by Piaget. This paper will apply a phenomenological descriptive method to contemporary classroom environments, influenced by Vygotsky's social constructivism, in order to bring to light a more concrete, lived version of this "Zone of Proximal Development". By re-examining this very significant pedagogical approach in terms of a phenomenology of space, place and dwelling it is hoped that some value and insight can be brought to the fields of teaching practice and the phenomenology of education.

Vygotsky L. (1978). Interaction between learning and development, mind and Society (pp. 79-91) Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP

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The Future of Phenomenology

Panel I: Phenomenology and the Arts

Jonathon Tuckett: *The Talos Principle: When does a bot become a person?*

The current sophistication of bot software on the internet - particularly as they appear in chatrooms - has given rise to situations in which internet users have struggled to distinguish between other "real" users and bots. But the question is, when does the bot become a "real" user itself? At core this is the question of philosophical anthropology: What is "Man"? And, whether AI and robots will someday constitute "Man" also. This question lies at the heart of the video game Talos Principle in which an AI program must "prove" its humanity. Similarly, films like I, Robot, Automata, and Ex Machina have implicitly addressed this question, and what makes these science fiction based examples interesting is how they centre on the theme of "deviance". In this respect they deviate from religious and social scientific responses to philosophical anthropology which have often centred on what I call the human prejudice: defining "Man" in terms of the biological human species.

In this paper I will argue that these science fiction-based considerations present implicit responses to philosophical anthropology that are closer to the more explicit formulations found in the phenomenologies of Max Scheler and Jean-Paul Sartre. Particularly in their approaches to intersubjectivity, there is an attempt to escape this human prejudice through their considerations of how we know the Other is "present". This paper will argue that these science fiction based examples provide a "sociological" indicator of the validity of their thought in this area.

Katrin Joost: *Photographic Phenomenology*

We encounter photographs every day, in papers and magazines, on TV, online, through social media, as well as all sorts of information material. It therefore shapes how we understand the world as possibly photographed (Sontag, 1977). The ubiquity of photography is so prevalent that we do not notice it anymore. Yet, photography shapes our being in the world.

According to Barthes' contemplation on photography (1980), it is a magical medium, since it is always of the particular and therefore disrupts the temporal flow and spacial logic of ordinary perception. Looking at, for example, the famous photograph *The Terror of War*, (Ut, 1972), depicting children running from a South Vietnamese attack, we see a particular girl, Phan Thị Kim Phúc when she was burned by a napalm bomb. We see that instant in 1972 in the image. Photography can transport us to that moment and show that particular girl.

Phenomenology reveals this fundamental aspect of photography. Moreover, photography itself can be seen as phenomenological investigation. Some photographic projects (e.g. Spence's *A Picture of Health*, 1985) disclose the nature of phenomena through the visualisation of what it means to experience them (e.g. suffering from cancer). Photographic image production can go beyond the sheer depiction of objects and engage the viewer on a very intuitive level with the phenomena they are about. Phenomenological analysis of how the world appears to us through the eidetic reduction and *epoché* is a complex philosophical process that still tends to be confined to words. Photography, arguably can be used to perform similarly, but do so in a much more intuitive manner. Husserl's call to *do* phenomenology (HUA III) could be achieved through doing photography.

Niall Keane: *Heidegger on the Experience of Art, Truth, and Poetry*

This talk will address the intersections of art, truth, and poetry in two texts by Heidegger from the mid-1930s. The first is the well-known 1935 essay "The Origin of the Work of Art", and the second is a less well-known lecture Heidegger gave in 1936 entitled: "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" I shall argue that these texts function as building blocks when it comes to understanding the intersections of art, truth, and poetry in Heidegger's work insofar as they address the 'essence' of art by taking up the question of the origin of art. Thus, these texts will serve as decisive indicators of Heidegger's engagement with the experience of art, truth, and poetry in the 1930s. Finally, these texts will be brought together with two of Heidegger's post-war lectures from 1958 entitled "The Essence of Language" and "The Word", which are meditations on the poetry of Stefan George. While there are notable differences of emphasis between these texts, I shall consider them as uniquely illustrative of the arc of Heidegger's attempts to rethink the essence of 'experience' (*Erfahrung*), the 'experience' of works of art and of poetry in particular, and to focus on the transformative nature of the 'experience' that these encounters bring about. The dialogue with Hölderlin and George, emerging in the wake of Heidegger's writing and rewriting of "The Origin of the Work of Art", identifies a special lucidity in the relationship between thought and poetry and the potentially transfigurative experience of language. It is precisely this transfigurative *poeitic* experience, insofar as it renders the human being more vulnerable and open to an experience of truth traditionally overlooked, which will be the focus of this talk.

Rachel Coventry: *Can Poetry break the Internet: A Heideggerian account of Post-Internet Poetry*

Sam Riviere's 2015 collection "Kim Kardashian's Marriage" is an example of Post-Internet poetry. Post-internet poetry is the practice of using Web content as the basis of poetry. This paper will attempt to show that a Heideggerian analysis can shed light on contemporary texts in a way that renews Heidegger's poetic thought and calls it into question in the light of new poetic practices. Specifically, Rivierie's collection will be considered in terms of Heidegger's opposing accounts of both technology and poetry. Social media is often understood in terms of *enframing* and thus it contributes to the "extreme danger" of the information age and the marginalization of art. However, this danger is accompanied by a saving power. Can a collection like Rivierie's succeed in make the 'danger' of social media explicit?